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Abstract
This paper extends the standard model of bundling as a price discrimination
device to allow products to be substitutes and for products to be supplied by sep-
arate sellers. Whether integrated or separate, rms have an incentive to introduce
a bundling discount when demand for the bundle is elastic relative to demand for
stand-alone products. Product substitutability typically gives an integrated rm a
greater incentive to o¤er a bundle discount (relative to the model with additive pref-
erences), while substitutability is often the sole reason why separate sellers wish to
o¤er inter-rm discounts. When separate sellers coordinate on an inter-rm discount,
they can use the discount to overturn product substitutability and relax competition.
1 Introduction
Bundling the practice whereby consumers are o¤ered a discount if they buy several dis-
tinct products is used widely by rms, and is the focus of a rich economic literature.
However, most of the existing literature discusses the phenomenon under relatively re-
strictive assumptions, namely a consumers valuation for a bundle of several products is
the sum of her valuations for consuming the items in isolation, and bundle discounts are
only o¤ered for products sold by the same rm. The two assumptions are related, in that
when valuations are additive it is less likely that a rm would wish to reduce its price to a
customer who also buys a product from another seller. This paper analyzes the incentive
to engage in bundling when these assumptions are relaxed.
There are very many situations in which modelling products as substitutes is relevant.
For instance, when visiting a city a tourist may gain some extra utility from visiting art
gallery A if she has already visited art gallery B, but the incremental utility is likely to be
This paper replaces an earlier draft with the title Bundling revisited: substitute products and inter-
rm discounts. I am grateful to a referee and associate editor, as well as to Jonathan Baker, Duarte
Brito, Andrew Rhodes, John Thanassoulis, Helder Vasconcelos, John Vickers and Jidong Zhou, for many
helpful comments.
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smaller than if she were only to visit A. Joint purchase discounts (or premia) on products
o¤ered by separate sellers are rarer, though some examples include:
 A tourist may be able to buy a city pass, so that she can visit all participating tourist
attractions at a discount on the sum of individual entry fees. These could be organized
either as a joint venture by the attractions themselves, or implemented by an intermediary
which puts together its own bundles given wholesale fees negotiated with attractions.
 Bundling is prevalent in markets for transport services, as is the case with alliances
between airlines or when neighboring ski-lifts o¤er a combined ticket.
 Products supplied by separately-owned rms are often marketed together with discounts
for joint purchase. Thus, supermarkets and gasoline stations may cooperate to o¤er a
discount when both services are consumed. Airlines and car rental rms may link up
for marketing purposes, and sometimes credit cards o¤er discounts proportional to spend
towards designated ights or hotels.
 Pharmaceuticals are sometimes used as part of a cocktailwith one or more drugs
supplied by other rms. Drugs companies can set di¤erent prices depending on whether
the drug is used on a stand-alone basis or in a cocktail.
 Marketing data may reveal useful information about a potential customers purchase
history which a¤ects a rms price to the customer. For instance, information that the
customer has chosen to buy rm 1s product may induce rm 2 to discount its price, and
an inter-rm discount for the joint purchase of the two products is implemented.
 At a wholesale level, a manufacturer may o¤er a retailer a discount if the retailer does
not stock a rival manufacturers product. (Such contracts are sometimes termed loyalty
contracts.) This is a situation with a bundle premium instead of a discount.
The plan of the paper is as follows. In section 2, I present a general framework for
consumer demand for two products in the presence of product substitutability and bundle
discounts. Section 3 covers the case where an integrated rm supplies both products.
I revisit the approach to bundling presented in Long (1984), which is used as a major
ingredient for the analysis in section 3. Longs result is that the rm has an incentive to
bundle when demand for the bundle is more elastic than demand for stand-alone products.
Relative to the situation with additive preferences, the integrated rm typically has a
greater incentive to o¤er a bundle discount when products are substitutable. Because
the purchase of one product can decrease a consumers incremental utility from a second,
the rm has a direct incentive to reduce the price for a second item, in addition to the
rent-extraction motive for bundling familiar from the existing literature. In examples we
see that the size of the discount can be above or below the corresponding discount with
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additive preferences.
In section 4 I turn to the situation where products are supplied by separate sellers.
With additive preferences, a rm has a unilateral incentive to o¤er a bundle discount when
product valuations are negatively correlated. When there is full market coverage, a rm
has an incentive to o¤er a joint-purchase discount under plausible conditions on consumer
valuations. When products are substitutes, whether a rm has a unilateral incentive to
introduce a discount depends on the way that preferences are modelled. When there is
a constant disutility of joint consumption, separate sellers typically wish to o¤er a joint-
purchase discount: the fact that a customer has purchased the rival product implies that
her incremental valuation for the rms own item has fallen, and this usually implies that
the rm would like to reduce its price to this customer. Alternatively, if a proportion
of buyers only want a single item (for instance, a tourist in a city might only have time
to visit a single museum) while other consumers have additive preferences, a seller would
like, if feasible, to charge a premium when a customer also buys the rival product. In
examples, when this form of price discrimination is feasible, one price increases and the
other decreases relative to the situation with uniform pricing, and price discrimination
results in higher equilibrium prot and higher welfare, but a worse outcome for consumers.
Finally, section 5 investigates partial coordination between separate sellers, which is
currently the relevant case for several of the industries mentioned above. Specically, I
suppose that rms rst agree on a bundle discount which they fund jointly, and subse-
quently choose prices without coordination. When valuations are additive, it is shown that
such a scheme will usually raise each rms prot, and, at least in the example considered,
its operation will also boost total welfare. However, when sellers o¤er substitute products,
the negotiated discount overturns the innate substitutability of products, inducing rms to
raise prices. The resulting tari¤-mediatedproduct complementarity can induce collusion
which harms consumers and overall welfare.
This paper is not the rst to investigate these issues. The incentive for an integrated
seller to o¤er a discount for the purchase of multiple items is discussed by Adams and Yellen
(1976), Long (1984) and McAfee, McMillan, and Whinston (1989), among many others.
The latter two papers showed that it is optimal to introduce a bundle discount whenever the
distribution of valuations is statistically independent and valuations are additive, so that a
degree of joint pricing is optimal even with entirely unrelated products. Except for Long,
these papers assume that valuations are additive.1 Long (1984) presents what could be
1Venkatesh and Kamakura (2003) analyze an integrated rms incentive to engage in bundling when
products are either complements or substitutes. The analysis is carried out using a specic uniform
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termed an economicmodel of bundling. Rather than following a diagrammatic exposition
concentrating on the details of joint distributions of two-dimensional consumer valuations,
he uses standard demand theory which applies equally to non-additive preferences to
derive conditions under which a bundle discount is optimal.
Schmalensee (1982) and Lewbel (1985) study the incentive for a single-product monop-
olist to o¤er a discount if its customers also purchase a competitively-supplied product.
Schmalensee supposes that two items are for sale to a population of consumers, and item
1 is available at marginal cost due to competitive pressure while item 2 is supplied by a
monopolist. Valuations are additive, but are not independent in the statistical sense. If
there is negative correlation in the values for the two items, the fact that a consumer buys
item 1 is bad newsfor the monopolist, who then has an incentive to set a lower price to
its customers who also buy 1. Lewbel performs a similar exercise but allows the two items
to be partial substitutes. In this case, the fact that a consumer buys item 1 is also bad
news for the monopolist, and gives an incentive to o¤er a discount for joint consumption.
Bundling arrangements between separate rms are analyzed by Gans and King (2006),
who investigate a model with two kinds of products (gasoline and food, say), and each
product is supplied by two di¤erentiated rms. When all four products are supplied by
separate rms which set their prices independently, there is no interaction between the two
kinds of product. However, two rms (one o¤ering each of the two kinds of product) can
enter into an alliance and agree to o¤er consumers a discount if they buy both products from
the alliance. (In their model, the joint pricing mechanism is similar to that used in section
5 below: rms decide on their bundle discount, which they agree to fund equally, and
then set prices non-cooperatively.) Gans and King observe that when a bundle discount is
o¤ered for joint purchase of otherwise independent products, those products are converted
into complements. In their model, in which consumer tastes are uniformly distributed, a
pair of rms does have an incentive to enter into such an alliance, but when both pairs
do this their equilibrium prots are unchanged from the situation when all four rms set
independent prices, although welfare and consumer surplus fall.2
Calzolari and Denicolo (2011) propose a model where consumers buy two products
and each product is supplied by a single rm. Each rm potentially o¤ers a nonlinear
example, and a consumers valuation for the bundle is some constant proportion (greater or less than one,
depending on whether complements or substitutes are present) of the sum of her stand-alone valuations.
The focus of their analysis is on whether pure bundling is superior to linear pricing.
2Brito and Vasconcelos (2010) modify this model so that rival suppliers of the same products are
vertically rather than horizontally di¤erentiated. They nd that when two pairs of rms form an alliance
all prices rise relative to the situation when all four products are marketed independently. This result
resembles the analysis in section 5 below, where an agreed bundle discount induces collusion in the market.
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tari¤ which depends on a buyers consumption of its own product and her consumption
of the other rms product. They nd that the use of these tari¤s can harm consumers
compared to the situation in which rms base their tari¤ only on their own supply. Their
model di¤ers in two ways from the one presented in section 4 of this paper. First, in
their model consumers have elastic (linear) demands, rather than unit demands, for the
two products. Thus, they must consider general nonlinear tari¤s, while the rms in my
model merely choose a pair of prices. Second, in my model consumers di¤er in richer way,
and a consumer might like product 1 but not product 2, and can vary in the degree of
substitutability between products. In Calzolari and Denicolo (2011), consumers di¤er by
only a scalar parameter (the demand intercept for both products), and so all consumers
view the two products when consumed alone as perfect substitutes.
Finally, Lucarelli, Nicholson, and Song (2010) discuss the case of pharmaceutical cock-
tails. Although the focus of their analysis is on situations in which rms set the same
price for a drug, regardless of whether it is used in isolation or as part of a cocktail, they
also consider situations where rms can set two di¤erent prices for the two kinds of uses.
They document how a rm selling treatments for HIV/AIDS set di¤erent prices for similar
chemicals depending on whether the drug was part of a cocktail or not. They estimate a
demand system for colorectal cancer drugs, where there are at least 12 major drug treat-
ments, 6 of which were cocktails combining drugs from di¤erent rms. Although in this
particular market rms do not price drugs di¤erently depending whether the drug is used
in a cocktail, they estimate the impact when one rm engages in this form of price dis-
crimination. They nd that a rm will typically (but not always) reduce the price for
stand-alone use and raise the price for bundled use.
2 A Framework for Consumer Demand
Consider a market with two products, labeled 1 and 2, where a consumer buys either
zero or one unit of each product (and maybe one unit of each). A consumer is willing to
pay vi for product i = 1; 2 on its own, and to pay vb for the bundle of both products.
(A consumer obtains payo¤ zero if she consumers neither product.) Thus a consumers
preferences are described by the vector (v1; v2; vb), which varies across the population of
consumers according to some known distribution.3 A consumer views the two products
3In the analysis which follows, we assume that the stand-alone valuations (v1; v2) have a continuous
marginal density with support on a compact rectangle in R2+. Given (v1; v2), the distribution of vb is
sometimes deterministic (as in Example 1 below), sometimes discrete (as in Example 2), and sometimes
continuous (as in Example 3). All we need to assume about the distribution of (v1; v2; vb) is that it is
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as partial substitutes whenever vb  v1 + v2. Whenever there is free disposal, so that
a consumer can discard an item without cost, we require that vb  maxfv1; v2g for all
consumers.
Only deterministic selling procedures are considered in this paper.4 Consumers face
three prices: p1 is the price for consuming product 1 on its own; p2 is the price for product
2 on its own, and p1 + p2    is the price for consuming the bundle of both products.
Thus,  is the discount for buying both products, which is zero if there is linear pricing or
negative if consumers are charged a premium for joint consumption. A consumer chooses
the option from the four discrete choices which leaves her with the highest surplus, so she
will buy both items whenever vb   (p1 + p2   )  maxfv1   p1; v2   p2; 0g, she will buy
product i = 1; 2 on its own whenever vi   pi  maxfvb   (p1 + p2   ); vj   pj; 0g, and
otherwise she buys nothing.
As functions of the three tari¤ parameters (p1; p2; ), denote by Q1 the proportion of
potential consumers who buy only product 1, Q2 the proportion who buy only product 2,
and Qb the proportion who choose the bundle. It will also be useful to discuss demand
when no discount is o¤ered, so let qi(p1; p2)  Qi(p1; p2; 0) and qb(p1; p2)  Qb(p1; p2; 0)
be the corresponding demand functions when  = 0. Indeed, we will see that a rms
incentive to introduce a bundle discount is determined entirely by the properties of the
no-discountdemands qi and qb. This is important insofar as these demand functions are
easier to estimate from market data than the more hypothetical demands Qi and Qb.5
Several properties of these demand functions follow immediately from the discrete
choice nature of the consumers problem, and are not contingent on whether the prod-
ucts are partial substitutes. To illustrate, note that total demand for each product is an
increasing function of the bundle discount, i.e.,
Qi +Qb increases with  . (1)
su¢ ciently well behaved that the demand functions shortly dened are di¤erentiable.
4Unlike the single-product case, when a monopolist sells two or more products it can often increase its
prots if it is able to use stochastic schemes (e.g., where for a specied price the consumer gets product 1
or product 2 but she is not sure which one). See Pavlov (2011) for a recent contribution to this topic, which
studies cases with extreme substitutes (all consumers buy a single item) and with additive preferences.
5The model of consumer preferences presented here is related to the small empirical literature which
estimates discrete consumer choice when multiple goods are chosen simultaneously. For instance, see
Gentzkow (2007) who estimates the degree of complementarity between print and online newspapers. In
his illustrative model in section 1.A, he supposes that the value of the bundle is the sum of the values of
the two individual products plus a constant term (which could be positive or negative), which is similar
to Example 1 discussed later in this paper.
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To see this, observe that a consumer buys product 1, say, if and only if
maxfvb   (p1 + p2   ); v1   p1g  maxfv2   p2; 0g :
(The left-hand side above is the consumers maximum surplus if she buys product 1 either
in the bundle or on its own while the right-hand side is the consumers maximum surplus
if she does not buy the product.) Clearly, the set of such consumers is increasing (in the
set-theoretic sense) in . In the case of separate supply, analyzed in section 4, this implies
that when a rm unilaterally introduces a bundle discount, its rivals prots will rise.
We necessarily have Slutsky symmetry of cross-price e¤ects, so that
@Q2
@p1
+
@Q2
@
 @Q1
@p2
+
@Q1
@
;
@Qb
@pi
+
@Qb
@
  @Qi
@
: (2)
For instance, the left-hand side of (2) says that the e¤ect on demand for good 2 on its own
of a price rise of good 1 on its own (which is achieved by increasing p1 and  by the same
amount so that the bundle price does not change) is the same as the e¤ect on demand
for good 1 on its own of price rise for good 2 on its own. Setting  = 0 in the right-hand
expression in (2) implies that the impact of a small bundle discount on the total demand
for a product is equal to the impact of a corresponding price cut on bundle demand, i.e.,
@(Qi +Qb)
@

=0
=  @qb
@pi
: (3)
This identity plays a key role when we analyze the protability of introducing a discount.
One price e¤ect which does depend on the innate substitutability of products is the
following:
Claim 1 Suppose that vb  v1 + v2 for all consumers. Then when linear prices are used,
demand for product i, qi + qb, weakly increases with pj.
(All omitted proofs are contained in the appendix.) Importantly, when a bundle discount
is o¤ered, this result can be reversed: even if products are intrinsically substitutes then
when  > 0 the demand for a product can decrease with the stand-alone price of the other
product. The observation that a bundle discount can overturn the innate substitutability
of products is a recurring theme in the following analysis.
A second property of demand which depends on product substitutability is that any
consumer who chooses to buy the bundle at linear prices (p1; p2) has vj  pj for each
j = 1; 2. To see this, note that if a consumer with preferences (v1; v2; vb) buys the bundle
at prices (p1; p2), then v1 + v2   p1   p2  vb   p1   p2  vi   pi, where the rst inequality
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follows from substitutability and the second is due to the superiority of the bundle to
product i on its own. Thus, minfv1 p1; v2 p2g  0. This implies that with linear pricing
there is no marginbetween buying the bundle and buying nothing, and any consumer
who optimally buys the bundle would instead buy a single item (if they change at all) rather
than exit altogether when faced with a small price rise. A second implication is that the set
of consumers who buy something with linear prices (p1; p2) consists of those consumers with
preferences satisfying maxfv1 p1; v2 p2g  0. (Clearly, if vi  pi then the consumer will
buy something, since product i on its own yields positive surplus. Those consumers who
buy the bundle lie inside this set since they satisfy minfv1 p1; v2 p2g  0.) In particular,
the fraction of participating consumers, which is q1(p1; p2)+ q2(p1; p2) + qb(p1; p2), depends
only on the (marginal) distribution of the stand-alone valuations (v1; v2).
3 Integrated Supply
3.1 Longs analysis revisited
Suppose that the market structure is such that an integrated monopolist supplies both
products. Here, and in section 4 with separate supply, suppose that the constant marginal
cost of supplying product i is equal to ci. To avoid tedious caveats involving corner solutions
in the following analysis, suppose that over the relevant range of linear prices there is some
two-item demand, so that qb > 0.
In this section I recapitulate the analysis in Long (1984), as the integrated-rm analysis
throughout section 3 rests on this. The rms prot with bundling tari¤ (p1; p2; ) is
 = (p1   c1)(Q1 +Qb) + (p2   c2)(Q2 +Qb)  Qb : (4)
Consider the incentive to o¤er a bundle discount. Starting from linear prices (p1; p2), by
di¤erentiating (4) we see that the impact on prot of introducing a small discount  > 0 is
@
@

=0
=

(p1   c1) @
@
(Q1 +Qb) + (p2   c2) @
@
(Q2 +Qb) Qb

=0
=  (p1   c1)@qb
@p1
  (p2   c2)@qb
@p2
  qb ; (5)
where the second equality follows from expression (3).
Although Long also considers the asymmetric case, his analysis is greatly simplied
when products are symmetric, and for the remainder of section 3 assume that c1 = c2 = c
and the same density of consumers have taste vector (v1; v2; vb) as have the permuted taste
vector (v2; v1; vb). Since the environment is symmetric, for convenience we consider only
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tari¤s which are symmetric in the two products. If the rm o¤ers price p for either product
and no bundle discount, write xs(p) and xb(p) respectively for the proportion of consumers
who buy a single item and who buy the bundle. (Thus, xs(p)  q1(p; p) + q2(p; p) and
xb(p)  qb(p; p).) From expression (5), a small discount is protable with stand-alone price
p in this symmetric setting if and only if
xb(p) + (p  c)x0b(p) < 0 : (6)
Consider whether this is satised at the most protable linear price, p. Since p maximizes
(p  c)(xs(p) + 2xb(p)), the rst-order condition for p is
xs(p
) + 2xb(p) + (p   c)(x0s(p) + 2x0b(p)) = 0 :
Taking this together with expression (6), we see that it is protable to introduce a bundle
discount if
 x0b(p)
xb(p)
>
 x0s(p)
xs(p)
so that bundle demand xb is more elastic than single-item demand xs at optimal price p.
This discussion is summarized in this result:6
Proposition 1 Suppose an integrated monopolist supplies two symmetric products. The
rm has an incentive to introduce a discount for buying the bundle whenever the demand
for a single item is less elastic than the demand for the bundle, so that
xb(p)
xs(p)
strictly decreases with p : (7)
Condition (7) is intuitive: if the rm initially charges the same price for buying a single
item as for buying a second item, and if demand for the latter is more elastic than demand
for the former, then the rm would like to reduce its price for buying a second item (and
to increase its price for the rst item).
Consider the familiar knife-edge case where a consumers valuation for the bundle is
the sum of her stand-alone valuations, i.e., vb  v1 + v2. With additive valuations, if the
rm o¤ers the linear price p for buying either item the consumers decision is simple: she
should buy product i whenever vi  p. Dene
	(p)  Prfv2  p j v1  pg ; (8)
6Long stated the result in the alternative, but equivalent, form whereby bundling was protable if the
ratio of total demand xs + 2xb to the number of customers xs + xb decreased when the price p increased.
When products are not symmetric, Long shows using a similar analysis that the rm has an incentive
to introduce a discount for buying the bundle whenever single-item demand is less elastic than bundle
demand, in the sense that qb=(q1 + q2) strictly decreases with an equi-proportional amplication of price-
cost mark-ups:
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so that
	(p) =
xb(p)
xb(p) +
1
2
xs(p)
and
xb(p)
xs(p)
=
1
2
 	(p)
1 	(p) :
Proposition 1 implies, therefore, that the rm has an incentive to introduce a bundle
discount if
	(p) strictly decreases with p (9)
(at the most protable linear price p). Condition (9) holds, roughly speaking, if v1 and v2
are not toopositively correlated. In particular, a degree of bundling is protable even
if valuations are additive and statistically independent. As we explore in the next section,
the more fundamental condition (7) is also useful for situations outside this additive case.
3.2 Bundling with substitute products
Using Longs condition (7), in this section I analyze in more detail the rms incentive to
bundle when preferences are not additive. One advantage of assuming symmetry in the
two products is that what is in general the three-dimensional nature of preferences reduces
to just two dimensions, since only the highest stand-alone valuation matters out of (v1; v2).
With this in mind, given preferences (v1; v2; vb), dene
V1  maxfv1; v2g ; V2  vb   V1 ; (10)
so that V1 is a consumers maximum utility if she buys only one item and V2 is her incre-
mental utility from the second item. Note that vb = V1+V2, so that valuations are additive
after this change of variables. Given the linear price p for each item, the type-(V1; V2) con-
sumer will buy one item if V1  p and V2 < p, and she will buy both items if V2  p and
V1+V2  2p, and this pattern of demand is depicted on Figure 1A. In general, a consumer
might buy both items even if she does not obtain positive surplus from buying only one, so
there is a marginbetween buying the bundle and buying nothing. However, if products
are substitutes this margin disappears: when vb  v1 + v2 then V2  minfv1; v2g  V1, and
the support of (V1; V2) lies under the 450 line as shown on Figure 1B.
From now on, assume that the products are substitutes. Similarly to (8), dene
(p)  PrfV2  p j V1  pg = PrfV2  pg
PrfV1  pg : (11)
By examining Figure 1B we see that xb = (xb + xs), or
xb(p)
xs(p)
=
(p)
1  (p) :
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Figure 1A: General case Figure 1B: Substitute products
Therefore, when  is strictly decreasing Proposition 1 implies that the monopolist has
an incentive to introduce at least a small bundle discount. In fact, we can obtain the
following non-local result, which is our main result for integrated supply:
Proposition 2 Suppose products are substitutes and  in (11) is strictly decreasing. Then
the most protable bundling tari¤ for a monopolist involves a positive bundle discount.
The fundamental condition which makes bundling protable for an integrated seller
is (7), and this condition applies regardless of whether products are substitutes or not.
However, the more transparent condition that  in (11) be decreasing only applies when
products are substitutes. Otherwise, the pattern of demand looks like Figure 1A above,
and  does not capture all the relevant demand information.
For i = 1; 2, write Gi(p) = PrfVi  pg for the marginal c.d.f. for valuation Vi and
gi(p) = G
0
i(p) for the corresponding marginal density. (The densities g1 and g2 are the
measures of the lines marked on Figure 1B.) The condition that  is decreasing is
equivalent to the hazard rates satisfying g1=(1   G1) < g2=(1   G2). As is well known, a
su¢ cient condition for this to hold is that the likelihood ratio
g1(p)
g2(p)
decreases with p : (12)
Whenever (12) holds, then, the rm has an incentive to introduce a bundle discount.
Proposition 2 applies equally to an alternative framework where the monopolist supplies
a single product, and where consumers consider buying one or two units of this product.
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Here, the parameter V1 represents a consumers value of one unit and V2 is her incremental
value for the second. Thus when consumers have diminishing marginal utility (V2  V1)
and  in (11) is decreasing, the single-product rm will o¤er a nonlinear tari¤ which
involves a quantity discount.7 (However, this alternative interpretation of the model is not
natural in the separate sellers context of section 4, since we would have to assume that for
some reason a supplier could only sell a single unit of the product to a consumer.)
A natural question is whether products being substitutes makes it more likely that the
integrated rm wishes to introduce a bundle discount, relative to the same market but
with additive valuations. Consider a market where the stand-alone valuations, v1 and v2,
have a given (symmetric) distribution. We know from Proposition 1 that the rm has
an incentive to o¤er a bundle discount whenever xb=xs is decreasing in the linear price
p, which is equivalent to the condition that xb=n decreases with p, where n  xs + xb is
the fraction of consumers who buy something from the rm. Consider two scenarios: in
scenario (a), each consumers valuation for the bundle is additive, so that vb  v1 + v2,
while in scenario (b) we have vb  v1 + v2. Write the fraction of consumers who buy both
items at linear price p in scenario (a) as xb(p) and the corresponding fraction in scenario
(b) as x^b(p). As discussed in section 2, n is exactly the same function in the two scenarios.
Thus, if x^b=xb (weakly) decreases with price, then whenever bundling is protable under
scenario (a) it is sure to be protable under scenario (b) as well. It is plausible, though
not inevitable, that demand x^b is more elastic than demand xb. Since V2  minfv1; v2g, it
follows that x^b  xb. Thus, for x^b to be more elastic we require that the slope  x^0b not be
too muchsmaller than  x0b.8
Intuitively, when products are substitutes there is an extra motive to o¤er a bundle
discount, relative to the additive case, which is to try to serve customers with a second
item even though the incremental utility of the second item is lowered by the purchase of
the rst item. Once a customer has purchased one item, this is bad news for her willingness-
to-pay for the other item, and this often gives the rm a motive to reduce price for the
7See Maskin and Riley (1984) for an early contribution to the theory of quantity discounts, where in
contrast to the current paper consumers di¤er by only a scalar parameter.
8An example where the substitutability of products makes the rm less likely to engage in bundling
is as follows. Suppose that vb = v1 + v2 if minfv1; v2g  k and vb = maxfv1; v2g otherwise, where k
is a positive constant. Thus, preferences are additive when both stand-alone valuations are high, while
if one valuation does not meet the threshold k the incremental value for the second item is zero. With
these preferences, whenever the linear price satises p < k those consumers with minfv1; v2g  k will buy
both items, and this set does not depend on p. Therefore, bundle demand x^b is completely inelastic for
p < k, while in the corresponding example without substitution (i.e., setting k = 0), bundle demand is
elastic. Whenever k is large enough that the equilibrium linear price is below k, the rm strictly lowers its
prots if it introduces a bundle discount: it reduces its revenue from those who buy the bundle without
any compensating boost to overall demand.
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second item. With additive preferences, the only motive in this model to use a bundle
discount is to extract information rents from consumers, and this motive vanishes if the
rm knows consumer preferences. With sub-additive preferences, the rm may wish to
o¤er a bundling tari¤ even when it knows the customers tastes. While with integrated
supply sub-additive preferences merely give one additional reason to bundle, with separate
sellers such preferences will often be the sole reason to o¤er a bundle discount, as discussed
in section 4.
3.3 Special cases
In this section I describe three special cases to illustrate this analysis of bundling incentives,
as well as some equilibrium bundling tari¤s.
Example 1: Constant disutility of joint consumption.
Consider the situation in which for all consumers
vb = v1 + v2   z (13)
for some constant z  0. Here, to ensure free disposal we assume that the minimum
possible realization of vi is greater than z. With a linear price pi for buying product i, the
pattern of demand is as shown on Figure 2. The next result provides a su¢ cient condition
for bundling to be protable in this setting.
Claim 2 Suppose that bundle valuations are given by (13). Suppose that each valuation
vi has marginal c.d.f. F and marginal density f , and the hazard rate f()=(1   F ()) is
strictly increasing. Then a monopolist has an incentive to o¤er a bundle discount when
condition (9) holds.
To illustrate, suppose that (v1; v2) is uniformly distributed on the unit square [1; 2]2,
and that z = 1
4
and c = 1. Then an integrated monopolist which uses linear prices will
choose p  1:521, generating prot of around 0:407. At this price, around 73% of potential
consumers buy something, although only 5% buy both products. The most protable
bundling tari¤ can be calculated to be
p  1:594 ;   0:380 ; (14)
which generates prot of about 0:446, and about 66% of potential consumers buy something
but now 28% buy both items. This bundle discount is large enough to outweigh the innate
13
substitutability of the products (i.e.,  > z), and faced with this bundling tari¤ consumers
now view the two products as complements rather than substitutes. (The resulting pattern
of demand looks as depicted in Figure 5.) Nevertheless, the discount in (14) is smaller than
it is in the corresponding example with additive valuations (i.e., when z = 0).9
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Figure 2: Pattern of demand with constant disutility of joint purchase
Example 2: Time-constrained consumers.
A natural reason why products might be substitutes is that some buyers are only
able to consume a restricted set of products, perhaps due to time constraints.10 To that
end, suppose that an exogenous fraction  of consumers have valuation vi for stand-alone
product i = 1; 2 and valuation vb = v1 + v2 for the bundle, while the remaining consumers
can only buy a single item (and have valuation vi if they buy item i). (See Figure 3
for an illustration.) For simplicity, suppose that the distribution for (v1; v2) is the same
for the two groups of consumers. Let 	() be as dened in (8). It is straightforward to
show (p) = 	(p)=(2   	(p)), so that  is decreasing if and only if 	 is. Proposition
2 therefore implies that when some consumers are time-constrained, an integrated rm
has an incentive to o¤er a bundle discount if and only if (9) holds, i.e., under the same
condition as when consumers have additive preferences. The reason is that when the rm
o¤ers a bundle discount this only a¤ects the  unconstrained consumers, and the sign of
the impact on prot is just as if all consumers had additive preferences.
9When c = 1, (v1; v2) is uniformly distributed on [1; 2]2 and vb  v1+ v2, one can check that p = 53 and
 =
p
2
3  0:47:
10In the context of competitive intra-rm bundling, Thanassoulis (2007) also analyzes the situation
where an exogenous fraction of consumers wish to buy a single product.
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Figure 3A: Unconstrained consumers Figure 3B: Time-constrained consumers
Example 3: Stand-alone values (v1; v2) are uniformly distributed on the unit square [0; 1]2,
and given (v1; v2) the bundle value vb is uniformly distributed on [maxfv1; v2g; v1 + v2].
(Recall that with free disposal we require that vb be at least maxfv1; v2g, and we
require vb  v1 + v2 if products are substitutes.) The support of (V1; V2) on Figure 1B
in this example is 0  V2  V1  1, and calculations reveal that the joint density for
(V1; V2) on this support is 2 log V1V2 . The marginal densities for V1 and V2 are respectively
g1(p) = 2p and g2(p) = 2(p   log p   1). It follows that xb(p) = 1   (p2   2p log p) and
xs(p) =  2p log p. If c = 0, the most protable linear price p maximizes p(xs(p) + 2xb(p)),
which entails p  0:540 and prot 0.406. About 70% of potential consumers buy something
with this tari¤, although just 4% of consumers buy the bundle.
One can check that xb=xs strictly decreases with p, and Proposition 1 implies that the
rm will wish to o¤er a bundle discount. One can modify Figure 1B to allow the rm to
o¤er a discount  > 0, and integrate the density for (V1; V2) over the regions corresponding
to single-item and bundle demand, to obtain explicit (but tedious) expressions for single-
item and bundle demands in terms of the tari¤ parameters (p; ). Using these expressions,
one can calculate the optimal bundling tari¤ to be p  0:648 and   0:588, which yields
prot 0.463. Notice that the bundle discount is now deeper compared to the corresponding
example with additive values.11 With this bundling tari¤, where the incremental price for
the second item is rather small, about 51% of potential consumers buy the bundle and
only 15% buy a single item.
11When c = 0, (v1; v2) is uniformly distributed on [0; 1]2 and vb  v1 + v2, one can check that   0:47:
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4 Separate Sellers
4.1 General analysis
I turn now to the situation where the two products are supplied by separate sellers. In
contrast to the integrated seller case, here there is no signicant advantage in assuming
that products are symmetric, and we no longer make that assumption. Suppose that the
sellers set their tari¤s simultaneously and non-cooperatively. (The next section discusses
a setting in which rms coordinate on their inter-rm bundle discount.) When rms
o¤er linear prices i.e., prices which are not contingent on whether the consumer also
purchases the other product rm i chooses its price pi given its rivals price to maximize
(pi   ci)(qi + qb), so that
qi

1  (pi   ci)
 @qi=@pi
qi

+ qb

1  (pi   ci)
 @qb=@pi
qb

= 0 : (15)
In some circumstances, a rm can condition its price on whether a consumer also buys
the other rms product. For instance, a museum could ask a visitor to show her entry ticket
to the other museum to claim a discount. Suppose now that rm i o¤ers a discount  > 0
from its price pi to those consumers who purchase product j as well. (Those consumers
who only buy product i continue to pay pi .) Then rm is prot is
i = (p

i   ci)(Qi +Qb)  Qb ; (16)
and the impact on prot of a small joint purchase discount is governed by the sign of
di
d

=0
, which from (3) is equal to
 qb   (pi   ci)
@qb
@pi
: (17)
When demand for the single item is less elastic than bundle demand, so that  @qi=@pi
qi
<
 @qb=@pi
qb
, the second term [] in (15) is strictly negative, i.e., (17) is strictly positive. In this
case, o¤ering a discount for joint purchase will raise the rms prot.
Thus, discounts for joint purchase can arise even when products are supplied by sep-
arate rms and when a rm chooses and funds the discount unilaterally. The reason is
straightforward: since the own-price elasticity of bundle demand is higher than that of
demand for its stand-alone product, a rm wants to o¤er a lower price to those consumers
who also buy the other product. As expression (1) shows, the introduction of a discount
will also benet the rival rm.
We summarise this discussion as:
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Proposition 3 Suppose that demand for the bundle is more elastic than demand for rm
is stand-alone product, in the sense that
qb(p1; p2)
qi(p1; p2)
strictly decreases with pi : (18)
Starting from the situation where rms set equilibrium linear prices p1 and p

2, rm i has
an incentive to o¤er a discount to those consumers who buy product j: If expression (18)
is reversed, so that qb=qi increases with pi, then rm i would like if feasible to charge its
customers a premium if they buy product j.
The crucial di¤erence between condition (18) and the corresponding condition (7) with
integrated supply is that with a single seller both prices are increased, whereas with separate
sellers only one price rises. With substitute products and linear pricing, a rm competes
on three fronts. If it raises its price: (i) some consumers will switch from buying the
bundle to buying the rival product alone; (ii) some will switch from buying its product
alone to buying the rival product alone, and (iii) some consumers will switch from buying
its product alone to buying nothing. (As discussed in section 2, with substitutes a possible
fourth margin between buying the bundle and buying nothing is absent.) Broadly speaking,
condition (18) requires that margins (ii) and (iii) together are less signicant, relative to
the size of associated demand, than margin (i).
When products are asymmetric, at the equilibrium linear prices it is possible that one
rm has an incentive to o¤er a discount when a customer also buys the other rms product,
but the other rm does not.12 However, it may well be that both rms choose to o¤er such
a discount. If rm i = 1; 2 o¤ers the price pi when a consumer only buys its product and the
price pi   i when she also buys the other product, a consumer who buys the bundle pays
the price p1+p2 1 2. The issue then arises as to how the combined discount  = 1+2
is implemented. For instance, a consumer might have to buy the two items sequentially,
and rms cannot simultaneously require proof of purchase from the other seller when they
o¤er their discount. However, there are at least two natural ways to implement this inter-
rm bundling scheme. First, the bundle discount could be implemented via an electronic
sales platform which allows consumers to buy products from several sellers simultaneously.
Sellers choose their prices contingent on which other products (if any) a consumers buys,
a website displays the total prices for the various combinations, and rms receive their
stipulated revenue from the chosen combination. With such a mechanism there is no need
12One simple way this can happen is when one rm sells to all consumers at the equilibrium linear prices,
while the other does not. Clearly, the latter rm has nothing to gain from making its price contingent on
whether its customers buy the other product, while the former may have such an incentive.
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for rms to coordinate their tari¤s. Second, there may be product aggregatorspresent
in the market who put together their own bundles from products sourced from separate
rms and retail these bundles to nal consumers. In the two-product case discussed in this
paper, aggregators bundle the two products together and each rm chooses a wholesale
price for its product contingent on being part of the bundle. If the aggregator market is
competitive, the price of the bundle will simply be the sum of the two wholesale prices.
Again, there is no need for rms to coordinate their prices.
A major di¤erence between this inter-rm bundling discount and the discount o¤ered by
an integrated supplier is that with separate sellers the discount is chosen non-cooperatively.
A bundle is, by denition, made up of two complementarycomponents, namely, rm 1s
product and rm 2s product, and the total price for the bundle is the sum of each rms
component price pi   i. When a rm considers the size of its own discount i, it ignores
the benet this discount confers on its rival. Thus, as usual with separate supply of
complementary components, double marginalization will result and the overall discount
 = 1 + 2 will be too small (for given stand-alone prices).
4.2 Special cases
In this section, I analyze in more depth various special cases where separate sellers have
an incentive to introduce a joint-purchase discount. Consider rst the situation where
consumer valuations are additive, so that margin (ii) discussed in section 4 is absent and
rms do not compete with each other:
Proposition 4 Suppose that valuations are additive, i.e., vb = v1 + v2. Starting from
the situation where rms set equilibrium linear prices, rm i has an incentive to o¤er a
discount to those consumers who buy the other product whenever Prfvj  p j vig strictly
increases with vi.
Whenever the valuations are negatively correlated in the strong sense that Prfvj  p j vig
decreases with vi, then, a rm has an incentive to o¤er a discount for joint purchase. Some-
what counter-intuitively, those rms which o¤er products which appeal to very di¤erent
kinds of consumer (boxing and ballet, say) may wish to o¤er discounts to consumers who
buy the other product.
In the oligopoly context, it is sometimes natural to consider situations with full coverage,
so that all consumers buy something for the relevant range of linear prices.13 (This is
13This is not a useful special case to consider in the context of integrated supply. For instance, Armstrong
(1996) shows how a monopolist will typically wish to exclude some consumers when consumers have multi-
dimensional private information (as they do here).
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relevant when the minimum possible realizations of v1 and v2 are su¢ ciently high.) When
the outside option of zero is not relevant for any consumers choice, all that matters for
demand is the distribution of incremental utilities, and given the triple (v1; v2; vb) dene
new variables
v^1  vb   v2 ; v^2  vb   v1 (19)
for the incremental valuation for product i given the consumer already has product j.
-
6
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-
6
p1
p2
v^1
v^2
buy only product 1
buy both products
buy only
product 2
Figure 4: Pattern of demand with full consumer coverage
As depicted on Figure 4, a consumer will buy both items with linear prices (p1; p2)
provided that v^1  p1 and v^2  p2, and otherwise she will buy product 1 instead of
product 2 when v^1   p1  v^2   p2. In particular, margin (iii) discussed in section 4.1
is no longer present, and this may boost the incentive to o¤er a bundle discount. Write
Gi(v^i j v^j) for the c.d.f. for v^i conditional on v^j, and write gi(v^i j v^j) for the associated
conditional density. Consider this assumption on the hazard rate:
gi(v^i j v^j)
1 Gi(v^i j v^j) strictly increases with v^i and weakly increases with v^j : (20)
It is somewhat reasonable to suppose that this hazard rate increases with v^i. That the
hazard rate weakly increases with v^j is perhaps less economically natural, but includes
independence of v^1 and v^2 as a particular case.
Proposition 5 Suppose at the relevant linear prices there is full consumer coverage. If
the incremental valuations in (19) satisfy condition (20), then rm i has an incentive to
o¤er a discount to those consumers who buy the other product.
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When the market is covered, this result suggests that the incentive to introduce a discount
contingent on buying another rms product is present for many pairs of suppliers.
We next consider the impact of inter-rm bundling in two of the examples with non-
additive valuations introduced in section 3.3.
Example 1. Here, the pattern of consumer demand was illustrated in Figure 2. Write
Hi(vi j vj) for the c.d.f. for vi conditional on vj and hi(vi j vj) for the associated conditional
density. The next result describes when a rm has a unilateral incentive to o¤er a bundle
discount. (The proof of the claim is similar to that for Proposition 5, and omitted.)
Claim 3 Suppose that bundle valuations satisfy (13) and the stand-alone valuations satisfy
hi(vi j vj)
1 Hi(vi j vj) strictly increases with vi and weakly increases with vj : (21)
Then a seller has an incentive to o¤er a discount to consumers who buy the rivals product.
It is economically intuitive that products being substitutes of the form (13) will give
the rm an incentive to o¤er a discount when its customers purchase the rival product. If
the potential customer purchases the other product, this is bad news for the rm as the
customers incremental value for its product has been shifted downwards by z, and this
provides an incentive to o¤er a lower price.
Consider the same specic example as presented in section 3 that is, (v1; v2) uniform
on [1; 2]2, z = 1
4
and c = 1 applied to the case with separate sellers. The equilibrium linear
price is p  1:446 and industry prot is about 0.399. Around 9% of consumers buy both
items with this linear price, and 80% buy something. The equilibrium non-cooperative
bundling tari¤ is
p1 = p2 = 1:476 ; 1 = 2 = 0:05 : (22)
Here, the combined bundle discount,  = 1 + 2, is about one quarter the size of the
discount with integrated supply in (14), reecting the earlier discussion that separate
rms will non-cooperatively choose too small a discount. Now, around 14% of consumers
buy both items, and industry prot rises to 0.421. Intuitively, when rms o¤er a bundle
discount, this reduces the e¤ective degree of substitution between products, which in turn
relaxes competition between rms. As reported in Table 2 below, relative to the outcome
with linear pricing, here consumers in aggregate are harmed, but total welfare rises, when
rms unilaterally o¤er a discount. Note that the equilibrium linear price lies between the
two discriminatory prices when rms engage in this form of price discrimination.14
14This is not surprising in the light of the analysis in Corts (1998), who shows that when the two rms
wish to set their lower price to the same group of customers (the weakmarket, which in this example is
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Example 2. Consider next the situation in which some consumers are time constrained, so
that a fraction  of consumers have additive preferences and the remaining consumers wish
to buy either product 1 or product 2. Suppose the distribution of stand-alone valuations
(v1; v2) is the same for the two kinds of consumer. Then we can obtain the following result:
Claim 4 Suppose that some consumers are time-constrained, and that stand-alone valua-
tions v1 and v2 are independently distributed, where vi has distribution function Fi() and
density fi(), and where for each i the hazard rate fi()=(1   Fi()) is strictly increasing.
When the two products are supplied by separate sellers, a seller has no incentive to o¤er
a discount to those consumers who buy the rival product. They would, if feasible, like to
charge their customers a higher price when they buy the rival product.
In this setting, the observation that a consumer wishes to buy both items implies she
belongs to the non-competitive group of consumers, and a rm would like to exploit
its monopoly position over those consumers if feasible. Of course, in many situations, a
consumer can hide her purchase from a rival rm, in which case a rm cannot feasibly levy
a premium when a customer buys another suppliers product. Comparing Examples 1 and
2 shows that the precise manner in which products are substitutes is important for a rms
incentive to o¤er a bundling discount unilaterally.
The fundamental condition governing when a rm unilaterally wishes to introduce a
joint-purchase discount is (18). All the special cases considered in this section have the
same underlying logic, which is to nd conditions under which single-item demand is more,
or less, elastic than bundle demand. With additive preferences, Proposition 4, shows that
negative correlation between the two valuations implies demand for a rms product on its
own is less elastic than demand for the bundle. This is due to the fact that the size of bundle
demand is then small relative to stand-alone demand. With full coverage, Proposition 5 (as
well as the closely related Claim 3) shows how single-item demand is less elastic than bundle
demand, but for a di¤erent reason: the margin (i) between buying the bundle and buying
only product 2 is more competitive than the margin (ii) between buying only product 1 or
only product 2. When some consumers are time-constrained (Claim 4), margin (ii) is now
less competitive than margin (i), and a rm wishes to raise its price to those consumers
the set of consumers who buy both products), then the equilibrium non-discriminatory price lies between
the two discriminatory prices. However, we cannot apply Cortsresult directly, since his argument relies
on there being no cross-price e¤ects across the two consumer groups, which is not the case here.
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wishing to buy the bundle.15
5 Partial Coordination Between Sellers
The analysis to this point has considered the two extreme cases where there is no tari¤
coordination between separate sellers (section 4), and where there is complete tari¤ co-
ordination (section 3). The problem with complete coordination is that any competition
between rivals is eliminated. As discussed in section 4, though, the welfare problem with a
policy of permitting no coordination between sellers is that the resulting bundle discount
may be ine¢ ciently small (or non-existent). It would be desirable to obtain the e¢ ciency
gains which may accrue to bundling without permitting the rms to collude over their
regular prices.
One way this might be achieved is if rms rst negotiate an inter-rm bundle discount,
the funding of which they agree to share, and then compete by choosing their stand-alone
prices non-cooperatively. Specically, suppose the two rms are symmetric and consider
the following joint pricing scheme: rms rst coordinate on bundle discount , and if rm
i = 1; 2 sets the stand-alone price pi then the price for buying both products is p1 + p2  
and rm i receives revenue pi   12 when a bundle is sold.
Consider rst the case where valuations are additive, so that competition concerns are
absent. Firm is prot under this scheme is
(pi   c)(Qi +Qb)  12Qb ; (23)
where each rms price is a function of the agreed discount  as determined by the second-
stage non-cooperative choice of prices. The impact of introducing a small  > 0 on rm is
equilibrium prot is equal to
d
d

(pi   c)(Qi +Qb)  12Qb
	
=0
=   1
2
Qb

=0
+ (p   c) @
@
(Qi +Qb)

=0
+

dpi
d

=0
 
@
@pi
[(pi   c)(Qi +Qb)]

=0;pi=pj=p
!
(24)
+

dpj
d

=0
 
@
@pj
[(pi   c)(Qi +Qb)]

=0;pi=pj=p
!
(25)
=  1
2
[xb(p
) + (p   c)x0b(p)] : (26)
15In technical terms, the di¤erence between the two cases is that in Figure 4, margin (ii) lies to the left
of margin (i), while in Figure 3 the reverse is true.
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Here, the two terms (24)(25) reect the indirect e¤ect of the discount on the rms prot
via its impact on the two prices, pi and pj, both of which vanish, and the nal expression
(26) follows from (3). Expression (24) vanishes because p is the optimal price for rm
i when rms choose linear prices (i.e., p maximizes (pi   c)(qi + qb)). Expression (25)
vanishes because changing the other rms price has no impact on a rms demand when
there is no bundling discount and valuations are additive (i.e., qi + qb does not depend
on pj when valuations are additive). Thus, the rst-order impact of  on industry prot
is that, for a xed stand-alone price p, the discount boosts overall demand but reduces
revenue from each bundle sold. Following the discussion in section 3.1, in the additive case
expression (26) is positive if and only if (9) holds. To summarize:
Proposition 6 Suppose that products are symmetric and valuations are additive. Con-
sider the coordinated bundling scheme whereby rm i = 1; 2 sets the stand-alone price pi
then the price for buying the bundle is p1 + p2   and rm i receives revenue pi  12 when
a bundle is sold. If condition (9) holds, for small discount  > 0 this scheme increases each
rms prot relative to the situation where the products are sold independently ( = 0).
This result suggests that a coordinated bundling scheme of this form could be protable
for many pairs of suppliers, even if they supply unrelated products. Proposition 6 could
be seen as a separate selleranalogue of the result for integrated monopoly derived by
Long (1984) and McAfee et al. (1989), who showed with additive preferences that when
condition (9) was satised it was protable for a monopolist to introduce a bundle discount.
-
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Figure 5: Pattern of demand in Example 1 with bundling discount  > z
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To illustrate, consider the specic case where (v1; v2) is uniformly distributed on [1; 2]2
and the marginal cost of each product is c = 1. This is a special case of Example 1 above,
with z set equal to zero. Figure 5 depicts the pattern of consumer demand in Example 1
for general z when the bundle discount  is larger than the substitution parameter z, as
will turn out to be the case in equilibrium. (The case with  < z looks like Figure 2.) Since
valuations are additive when z = 0, without coordination on the inter-rm discount (so
 = 0) rms set price p = 3
2
. The resulting payo¤s in the market are reported in the rst
row of Table 1. If rms rst coordinate on  and then choose price non-cooperatively, one
can check that the most protable discount is   0:384, which implements the higher price
p  1:669.16 The corresponding payo¤s are reported in the second row of this table. In
this example, then, allowing the rms to coordinate on an inter-rm discount boosts prot,
harms consumers in aggregate, and (slightly) increases overall welfare. Because valuations
are additive and statistically independent, rms would not wish unilaterally to introduce
a joint-purchase discount in this market.
industry prot consumer surplus welfare
linear pricing ( = 0) 0.500 0.250 0.750
coordinated discount ( = 0:384) 0.544 0.210 0.754
Table 1: Market outcomes with and without coordination on discount (z = 0)
While the operation of the joint-pricing scheme appears relatively benign when values
are additive, this can be reversed when rms o¤er substitutable products. Consumers
benet, and total welfare rises, when rms are forced to set low prices due to products being
substitutes. However, an agreed inter-rm discount can reduce the e¤ective substitutability
of products and relax competition between suppliers. To illustrate this e¤ect, modify the
preceding example so that z = 1
4
. The impact of partial coordination in this case is
reported in Table 2. As derived in section 4.2, with linear pricing rms choose price
p  1:446 and the resulting payo¤s are given in the rst row. When rms coordinate
on the bundle discount and then choose stand-alone prices non-cooperatively, their most
protable choice is   0:39, which implements price p  1:588, and payo¤s are given in the
second row.17 In contrast to Table 1, now total welfare falls when rms coordinate on the
discount, reecting the high prices which are then induced. For comparison, the third row
reports payo¤s when rms choose their joint-purchase discount non-cooperatively, when
16Recall from footnote 9 that the bundling tari¤ chosen by an integrated supplier in this example involves
a deeper discount but essentially the same stand-alone price.
17This tari¤ is similar to that o¤ered when the rms fully coordinate their retail tari¤s, when the tari¤
is (14). As such, the payo¤s when rms fully coordinate their tari¤s is similar to the gures given in the
second row of Table 2.
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the equilibrium tari¤ is (22) above. For rms and consumers, the resulting outcome is
intermediate between the outcomes with linear pricing and with a coordinated discount;
however it generates the highest welfare level of the three regimes. At least in this example,
a modest bundle discount enhances welfare, but when rms coordinate on the discount,
they choose too deep a discount from a welfare perspective.
industry prot consumer surplus welfare
linear pricing ( = 0) 0.399 0.261 0.660
coordinated discount ( = 0:390) 0.449 0.202 0.651
non-cooperative discount ( = 0:1) 0.421 0.244 0.665
Table 2: Market outcomes with and without coordination on discount (z = 1
4
)
Thus, the apparently pro-consumer policy of coordinating to o¤er a discount for joint
purchase may act as a device to sustain collusion. This suggests that negotiated inter-
rm discounting schemes operated by rms supplying substitutable products should be
viewed with some suspicion by antitrust authorities, although non-cooperative discounting
schemes as analyzed in section 4 may actually be welfare-enhancing.
6 Conclusions
This paper has extended the standard model of bundling to allow products to be partial
substitutes and for products to be supplied by separate sellers. With monopoly supply,
building on Long (1984), we typically found that the rm has an incentive to o¤er a bundle
discount in at least as many cases as with the traditional model with additive valuations.
Sub-additive preferences give the rm an additional reason to o¤er a bundle discount,
which is to better target a low price for a second item at those customers who are inclined
(with linear prices) to buy a single item. We observed that the impact of substitutability
could amplify or diminish the size of the most protable bundle discount.
When products were supplied by separate rms, we found that a rm often has a uni-
lateral incentive to o¤er a joint-purchase discount when their customers buy rival products.
In such cases, inter-rm bundle discounts are achieved without any need for coordination
between suppliers. The two principal situations in which a rm might wish to do this are
(i) when product valuations are negatively correlated in the population of consumers, and
(ii) when products are substitutes in such a way that bundle demand was more elastic than
single-item demand. While product substitutability makes bundle demand smaller than it
would otherwise be, it need not make such demand more elastic. Plausible kinds of substi-
tution lead rms to o¤er either a joint-purchase discount or a joint-purchase premium. In
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an example (Example 1) we saw that when rms price discriminate in this manner, relative
to the uniform pricing regime equilibrium prots are higher and welfare rises. One reason
why prots rise is that when rms o¤er an inter-rm bundle discount, this mitigates the
innate substitutability of their products and competition is relaxed.
Historically, this form of price discrimination was not often observed. In many cases,
in order to condition price on a purchase from a rival supplier, a rm would need a paper
trailsuch as a receipt from the rival. One problem with this system is that customers are
then encouraged to visit the rival rm rst, and because of transaction and travel costs,
this might mean that fewer customers would actually come to the rm. A second problem
is that it is hard for two rms to o¤er such discounts, since a customer might have to visit
the rms sequentially. However, as discussed in section 4, these two related problems can
nowadays often be overcome with modest methods of selling, and we may see greater use
of this kind of contingent pricing in future.
A more traditional way to implement inter-rm bundling is for rms to coordinate
aspects of their pricing strategy. In this paper I examined one particular kind of coordina-
tion, which is where rms agree on a joint purchase discount, and subsequently choose their
prices non-cooperatively. Because a bundle discount mitigates the innate substitutability
of rival products, separate sellers can use this mechanism to lessen rivalry in the market.
Thus, rms often have an incentive to explore joint pricing schemes of this form, and
regulators have a corresponding incentive to be wary.
In future work it would be useful to extend the analysis in this paper in at least three
directions. First, how do the results change if the products are complements rather than
substitutes? Second, what happens if the products in question are intermediate products?
It may be that the framework studied here could sometimes be extended to situations
where rival manufacturers potentially supply products to a retailer, which then supplies
one or both products to nal consumers. If products are partial substitutes, might a
manufacturer have an incentive to charge a lower price if the retailer also chooses to supply
the rival product? This would then be the opposite pricing pattern to the loyalty pricing
schemes which worry antitrust authorities. Finally, it would be interesting to explore
whether a largerm has an incentive to exclude smaller rms from its internal bundling
policies, with the aim of driving these rivals out of the market. In a famous antitrust
case concerning ski-lifts in the Aspen resort, described in Easterbrook (1986), one small
ski-lift operator successfully sued a larger operator for not permitting it to participate in
its multi-mountain ski-pass scheme.
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APPENDIX
Proof of Claim 1: A type-(v1; v2; vb) consumer buys product 1 if and only if
maxfvb   p1   p2; v1   p1g  maxfv2   p2; 0g : (27)
I claim that the di¤erence between the two sides in (27), that is
maxfvb   p1   p2; v1   p1g  maxfv2   p2; 0g ; (28)
is weakly increasing in p2 for all (v1; v2; vb). (This then implies that the set of consumer
types who buy product 1 is increasing, in the set-theoretic sense, in p2, and so the measure
of such consumers is increasing in p2.) The only way in which expression (28) could strictly
decrease with p2 is if vb   p1   p2 > v1   p1 and v2   p2 < 0. However, since products
are substitutes we have vb  v1 + v2, which implies that the above pair of inequalities are
contradictory. This establishes the result. 
Proof of Proposition 2: We know already that choosing  > 0 is more protable than
choosing  = 0 when expression (7) holds, which in turn is true when (11) is strictly
decreasing. Therefore, it remains to rule out the possibility that a tari¤ with a quantity
premium is optimal. So suppose to the contrary that the rm makes greatest prot by
charging P1 for the rst item and P2 > P1 for the second. By modifying Figure 1B to allow
P2 > P1, one sees that the rms prot takes the additively separable form
(1 G(P1))(P1   c) + (1 G(P2))(P2)(P2   c)
28
where we write G(p)  PrfV1  pg. This prot is therefore greater than when the rm
o¤ers either of the linear prices P1 and P2. That is to say
(1 G(P1))(P1 c)+(1 G(P2))(P2)(P2 c)  (1 G(P1))(P1 c)+(1 G(P1))(P1)(P1 c)
or
(1 G(P2))(P2)(P2   c)  (1 G(P1))(P1)(P1   c) ; (29)
and
(1 G(P1))(P1 c)+(1 G(P2))(P2)(P2 c)  (1 G(P2))(P2 c)+(1 G(P2))(P2)(P2 c)
or
(1 G(P1))(P1   c)  (1 G(P2))(P2   c) : (30)
Since (11) is strictly decreasing, (29) implies that
(1 G(P2))(P2)(P2   c) > (1 G(P1))(P2)(P1   c) ;
which contradicts expression (30). Thus, the most protable tari¤ involves P2 < P1. 
Proof of Claim 2: From Figure 2 we see that with linear price p for either product we
have
xb(p) = (1  F (p+ z))	(p+ z) ; xs(p) = (1  F (p))(2 	(p))  xb(p) ;
and so (11) is given by
(p) =
xb(p)
xs(p) + xb(p)
=
(1  F (p+ z))	(p+ z)
(1  F (p))(2 	(p)) :
Di¤erentiating shows that  is strictly decreasing with p if and only if
	0(p)
2 	(p) +
	0(p+ z)
	(p+ z)
<
f(p+ z)
1  F (p+ z)  
f(p)
1  F (p) :
Since F is assumed to have an increasing hazard rate, the right-hand side of the above
is non-negative, while if condition (9) holds then the left-hand side is strictly negative.
Therefore,  is strictly decreasing and Proposition 2 implies the result. 
Proof of Proposition 4: Let Fi(vi) and fi(vi) be respectively the marginal c.d.f. and the
marginal density for vi, and let H(vi)  Prfvj  pj j vig, where pj is rm js equilibrium
linear price. Then
qi(pi; p

j) =
Z 1
pi
H(vi)fi(vi)dvi ; qb(pi; p

j) =
Z 1
pi
(1 H(vi))fi(vi)dvi (31)
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and
 @qi
@pi
= H(pi)fi(pi) ;  @qb
@pi
= (1 H(pi))fi(pi) :
Since H is assumed to be strictly increasing in vi, it follows from (31) that
qi(pi; p

j) > H(pi)(1  Fi(pi)) ; qb(pi; pj) < (1 H(pi))(1  Fi(pi))
and so
  1
qi
@qi
@pi
<
fi(pi)
1  Fi(pi) <  
1
qb
@qb
@pi
and Proposition 3 implies the result. 
Proof of Proposition 5: Suppose pi  pj as depicted on Figure 4. (The case where
pi < pj is handled in a similar manner.) Let hj(v^j) denote the marginal density for v^j.
From the gure we see that
qb =
Z 1
pj
(1 Gi(pi j v^j))hj(v^j)dv^j ;  @qb
@pi
=
Z 1
pj
gi(pi j v^j)hj(v^j)dv^j :
From assumption (20) we obtain
 @qb
@pi
=
Z 1
pj
gi(pi j v^j)hj(v^j)dv^j
=
Z 1
pj
gi(pi j v^j)
1 Gi(pi j v^j)(1 Gi(pi j v^j))hj(v^j)dv^j
 gi(pi j pj)
1 Gi(pi j pj)qb :
Similarly,
qi =
Z pj
0
(1 Gi(v^j + pi   pj j v^j))hj(v^j)dv^j ;  @qi
@pi
=
Z pj
0
gi(v^j + pi   pj j v^j))hj(v^j)dv^j :
From assumption (20) we obtain
 @qi
@pi
=
Z pj
0
gi(v^j + pi   pj j v^j)hj(v^j)dv^j
=
Z pj
0
gi(v^j + pi   pj j v^j)
1 Gi(v^j + pi   pj j v^j)(1 Gi(v^j + pi   pj j v^j))hj(v^j)dv^j
<
Z pj
0
gi(pi j v^j)
1 Gi(pi j v^j)(1 Gi(v^j + pi   pj j v^j))hj(v^j)dv^j
 gi(pi j pj)
1 Gi(pi j pj)qi :
It follows that
  1
qi
@qi
@pi
<
gi(pi j pj)
1 Gi(pi j pj)   
1
qb
@qb
@pi
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and Proposition 3 implies the result. 
Proof of Claim 4: From Figure 3 we see that
qb = (1  F1(p1))(1  F2(p2)) ;  @qb
@p1
= f1(p1)(1  F2(p2))
so that
  1
qb
@qb
@p1
=
f1(p1)
1  F1(p1) : (32)
The demand for product 1 on its own comes from two sources: the unconstrained and the
constrained consumers. Write
q1 = x+ (1  )X
where x and X are respectively product 1 demand from the unconstrained and constrained
consumers. From Figure 3 we see that
x = 1  F1(p1) ; X = F2(p2)(1  F1(p1)) +
Z 1
p2
f2(v2)(1  F1(v2 + p1   p2))dv2 :
We need to show that (18) is reversed, so that   1
q1
@q1
@p1
is greater than (32). But   1
q1
@q1
@p1
is a weighted sum of   1
x
@x
@p1
and   1
X
@X
@p1
, and   1
x
@x
@p1
is exactly equal to (32). It follows that
(18) is reversed if and only if   1
X
@X
@p1
is greater than (32). But
 @X
@p1
= f1(p1)F2(p2) + f2(p2)(1  F1(p1)) +
Z 1
p2
f2(v2)f1(v2 + p1   p2)dv2
= f1(p1)F2(p2) + f2(p2)(1  F1(p1))
+
Z 1
p2
f2(v2)(1  F1(v2 + p1   p2)) f1(v2 + p1   p2)
1  F1(v2 + p1   p2)dv2
> f1(p1)F2(p2) + f2(p2)(1  F1(p1)) + f1(p1)
1  F1(p1)
Z 1
p2
f2(v2)(1  F1(v2 + p1   p2))dv2
>
f1(p1)
1  F1(p1)X :
The rst inequality follows from the assumption that f1=(1 F1) is an increasing function,
while the second inequality can be veried directly. This completes the proof. 
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